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Executive Summary
V
iolence against ethnic 
and other minority 
groups living in Burma 
(officially the Union of 
Myanmar) has marked 
the country’s history over 
the past several decades. Burma’s former 
military regime made common practice 
of targeting ethnic communities for 
forced labor, sexual violence, and other 
serious crimes. Under Burma’s current 
nominally democratic government, 
violence against marginalized groups 
has escalated to an unprecedented 
level as Rohingyas and other Muslims 
throughout Burma face renewed acts 
of violence. Persecution and violence 
against Rohingyas, a Muslim group long 
excluded from Burmese society and 
denied citizenship, has spread to other 
Muslim communities throughout the 
country. Serious human rights violations, 
including anti-Muslim violence, have 
resulted in the displacement of nearly 
250,000 people since June 2011, as  
well as the destruction of more than 
10,000 homes, scores of mosques, and  
a dozen monasteries. 
The successive waves of violence too 
often go unpunished by the Burmese 
government. At times, the crimes have 
even been facilitated by the police. The 
failure of the Burmese government to 
properly protect its people and address 
human rights violations committed by 
police officers signals serious obstacles 
ahead on the path from military dicta-
torship to a truly democratic country 
where everyone has a voice and the 
rights of all people are respected and 
protected.
One of the most extreme and alarming 
examples of anti-Muslim violence was 
the March 2013 massacre of dozens of 
Muslim students, teachers, and other 
community members in Meiktila, a 
town in central Burma. Physicians for 
Human Rights (PHR) conducted an in-
depth investigation into those killings 
and released a report in May 2013 de-
tailing the crimes. In an effort to place 
this particular incident in the wider  
context of ongoing violence, PHR  
produced this report to analyze and 
asses patterns of extreme violence 
from various sites across the country, 
which indicate that the government 
has consistently failed to properly ad-
dress attacks driven by hate speech 
and racism. Further investigation by an 
independent commission is necessary 
to uncover additional details about the 
organization and motivation behind the 
recent violence.
There are no simple solutions to stem ris-
ing tides of religious hatred and violence. 
The people of Burma face the significant 
task of choosing how to grapple with 
intolerance and anti-Muslim hatred, as 
well as myriad abuses by the government 
against other marginalized groups. The 
ultimate responsibility, however, rests 
with the Government of Burma, which 
must ensure that people are protected 
from violence and that any perpetrators 
are investigated, arrested, and charged 
according to fair and transparent legal 
standards. As this report demonstrates, 
while there have been several arrests 
following some of the most extreme 
outbreaks of violence, the government 
must do more not only to respond to the 
individual acts of violence, but also to 
promote an atmosphere of tolerance and 
acceptance where the rights of all people 
are protected. The Burmese government 
also has the responsibility to find durable 
solutions to end violence that respect 
ethnic diversity. Institutionalized displace-
ment and segregation are abhorrent and 
unsustainable responses that have devas-
tating consequences for those displaced 
by violence or fear of persecution.
PHR conducted eight separate investi-
gations in Burma and the surrounding 
region between 2004 and 2013. PHR’s 
most recent field research in early 2013 
indicates a need for renewed attention  
to violence against minorities and  
impunity for such crimes. The findings 
presented in this report are based on 
investigations conducted in Burma over 
two separate visits for a combined  
21-day period between March and  
May 2013. 
The Government of Burma, civil society 
leaders, and the international community 
must act immediately to stop anti-Muslim 
violence in the country. The unhampered 
spread of violent incidents across Burma 
exposes concerning indicators of future 
violence. There is, for instance, rapid 
dissemination of hate speech against 
marginalized groups, widespread impu-
nity for most perpetrators, and inaction 
or acquiescence by many leaders in gov-
ernment and the democracy movement. 
As we have witnessed in the past, these 
elements are ingredients for potential 
catastrophic violence in the future,  
including potential crimes against  
humanity and/or genocide. If left  
unchecked, this particular combination 
could lead to mass atrocities on a scale 
heretofore unseen in Burma. 
Physicians for Human Rights
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A formerly functioning mosque that was reduced to rubble during the violence in Meiktila, Burma in March 2013.
Photo: Richard Sollom.
internationally recognized legal norms. 
The international community must not 
be reluctant to confront a country just 
because it has made some recent po-
litical improvements. Instead, all those 
dedicated to ending violence must see 
the crimes in Burma as a horrible ex-
ample of what happens when impunity 
reigns and demagogues are not con-
fronted, and as an urgent warning sign 
of potential atrocities.
The impunity of the former Burmese 
regime and the renewed waves of 
recent violence demand an immediate 
response not only to properly address 
the crimes of the past, but also to 
stem the escalation of violence. All 
people of Burma deserve decisive and 
effective action to combat hate speech 
and impunity, within the bounds of 
For full policy recommendations,  
please see page 28.
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Anti-Muslim 
Violence:  
June 2012 
to Present
May 28, 2012
A 27-year-old Buddhist Rakhine seamstress is 
raped and murdered by a group of men. The 
next day, police arrest three Muslim suspects.
June 3, 2012
A Rakhine mob pulls 10 Muslims from a bus  
and kills them in retaliation for the rape and 
murder of the seamstress. Anti-Muslim  
leaflets are distributed before the attack.
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B
urma’s Muslims have faced 
an unprecedented number 
of attacks since mid-2012, 
resulting in injury, displace-
ment, economic hardship, 
and death. The recent 
upsurge in violence began in June 
2012 after three Muslim men allegedly 
raped and killed a Buddhist woman 
in Rakhine State in western Burma.1 
A mob of Buddhists then pulled 10 
Muslims—nine men and one woman—
off of a bus and lynched them, spark-
ing riots by ethnic Rohingya Muslims 
in the northern Rakhine townships2 
of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.3 Non-
Muslim Rakhine civilians retaliated to 
the reported June incident in force,  
in some cases supported by police offi-
cers and members of the military. The 
immediate result was approximately 
200 people killed, 100,000 people 
displaced, and 8,500 homes destroyed, 
according to estimates from the 
Burmese government.4 The violence in 
Rakhine State was followed by another 
wave in October 2012 that resulted in 
more than 80 deaths and displaced 
over 35,000 people.5 Since then,  
sporadic attacks against Muslims have 
continued across the country resulting 
in even more killing and displacement. 
Serious human right violations, includ-
ing anti-Muslim violence, have resulted 
in the displacement of nearly 250,000 
people since June 2011,6 as well as 
the destruction of more than 10,000 
homes,7 scores of mosques, and a  
dozen monasteries.8
Burma (officially the Union of 
Myanmar) is a diverse country with 
many different ethnic groups, lan-
guages, and religions. The majority 
Burman ethnic group makes up 60 
to 70 percent of the population and 
has controlled the government and 
military for six decades.9 The country is 
nearly 90 percent Buddhist, according 
to government figures; other religions 
in Burma include Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism, and Animism.10 Muslims in 
Burma are a diverse community among 
themselves, tracing their roots to sever-
al waves of migration that began with 
Persian traders before the advent of 
Islam.11 Muslims currently comprise an 
estimated 4 to 10 percent of Burma’s 
total population.12 The largest Muslim 
population living in Burma today is 
concentrated in Rakhine State, which is 
home to approximately 800,000 ethnic 
Rohingya.13
The root causes of the anti-Muslim 
violence are complex. Though Muslim 
minorities have a long history in Burma, 
it has not always been peaceful. With 
a longstanding fear of perceived out-
siders, Buddhist nationalist groups 
and individuals have dredged up old 
conflicts—such as the mujahid re-
bellion for independence in Rakhine 
State following World War II—in an 
effort to incite Buddhist nationalism.14 
Hate speech by prominent monks and 
anti-Muslim movements, which has 
been facilitated by the opening up of 
June 7, 2012
The Burmese government launches an  
investigation into the murder of the  
10 Muslim pilgrims.
June 8, 2012
Rohingyas riot after Friday prayers; sectarian 
violence breaks out in several towns across 
Rakhine State. Muslims report security  
forces and mobs of Rakhine subjecting  
them to arbitrary arrests, physical attacks, 
rape, and killings.
Ethnic Rakhine demonstrators protest at the 
Shwedagon pagoda in Rangoon after unrest 
flared in western Burma and seven people 
were killed in June 2012. 
Photo: Ye Aung Thu/AFP/GettyImages.
Serious human rights violations, including 
anti-Muslim violence, have resulted in the 
displacement of nearly 250,000 people since  
June 2011, as well as the destruction of more 
than 10,000 homes, scores of mosques, and a 
dozen monasteries.
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access to the Internet and social media 
websites, allows anti-Muslim rhetoric 
to spread farther and faster than be-
fore. International news media accuse 
a Buddhist nationalist movement called 
“969” and a notorious radical monk, 
Wirathu, of spearheading anti-Muslim 
propaganda.15 The 969 movement 
promotes the boycott of Muslim busi-
nesses and encourages Buddhists to 
display 969 logos on their homes, 
businesses, and vehicles in a show of 
solidarity. Wirathu and other monks 
linked to the 969 movement delivered 
anti-Muslim speeches in early 2013 
in Mandalay Region,16 Gyobingauk 
Township,17 Minhla18 in Bago Region, 
Okkan,19 Taunggyi,20 and near Lashio21 
in the days before anti-Muslim vio-
lence erupted in those towns. A recent 
news report noted that Wirathu called 
the massacre of Muslims in Meiktila 
a “show of strength.”22 Following the 
attacks in Meiktila, DVDs were sold in 
Mandalay that contained video foot-
age, reportedly shot during the Meiktila 
riots in March 2013, of Muslims being 
burned and beaten to death. The DVDs 
were being sold by Buddhists with 
“pride and glee,” according to a person 
who bought them.23
The Burmese government’s long history 
of sponsoring Buddhist nationalism 
and the marginalization of all ethnic 
minority groups, combined with weak 
attempts to stop violence as it occurs 
and its history of cultivating impunity 
for human rights violators, have fueled 
the spread of anti-Muslim violence.24 
Despite widespread rumors connecting 
political elites or other influential  
people with the recent spikes in  
violence,25 corroboration of these  
reports has been difficult. While  
additional investigation is necessary 
to uncover the nature and extent of 
the connections between high-level 
political elites and any organizers of 
the recent violence, the Government 
of Burma’s failure to appropriately stop 
attacks and protect those at risk implies 
an unacceptable measure of support 
for the acts of violence.
Current Burmese laws do little to pro-
vide protection for ethnic and religious 
minorities, especially Muslims. Criminal 
law in Burma since the 1960s has  
heavily favored state security over 
the protection of citizens’ rights. The 
Burmese legal system has operated 
for decades as an arm of state op-
pression rather than an institution 
dedicated to promoting justice and 
accountability—the system was set up 
to arrest whomever those in power 
wanted to arrest.26 A 1982 law that lists 
citizenship requirements for Burma, 
as well as a statement by the former 
junta that excludes Rohingyas from 
the arbitrary 135 recognized national 
races of Burma, have rendered the 
Rohingya stateless. The effects of state-
lessness have had a significant impact 
on Rohingyas, such as restrictions on 
education27 and marriage, though the 
marriage regulations apply only to 
Rohingyas living in the northern part of 
Rakhine State.28 Forced labor,29 extor-
tion,30 restrictions on movement, and 
targeted taxation31 by the government 
also apply specifically to Rohingyas in 
northern Rakhine State.31
Other Burmese Muslims have also felt 
the effects of this exclusion. While they 
are issued identity cards, in order to 
acquire them, they frequently have to 
pay a bribe and declare that they are 
from another country, such as Pakistan 
or India.33 Most Muslims refrain from 
working in the police and military, 
where they face institutional discrim-
ination.34 The effects of decades of 
state-sponsored discrimination against 
ethnic minorities are twofold: first, they 
create an environment in which abuse 
June 10, 2012
President Thein Sein declares a state of 
emergency.
Police patrol in a 
truck on the streets 
of Sittwe, capital  
of Rakhine State,  
in June 2012.  
Photo: STR/AFP/
GettyImages
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against ethnic minorities is acceptable, 
and second, the lack of effective ac-
countability mechanisms emboldens 
perpetrators to commit abuses without 
consequence. There is thus little risk for 
people who attack Muslims in Burma.
Not all Buddhists in Burma are  
anti-Muslim; many of them have 
risked their own lives to protect their 
Muslim neighbors, and several groups 
have spoken out against recent vi-
olence.35 Monasteries in Shan State 
and Mandalay Division have sheltered 
Muslims fleeing the violence.36 Groups 
of Buddhist monks, such as the All 
Burma Monks’ Alliance, have issued 
statements condemning the violence.37 
Dozens of civil society groups— 
including Interfaith Youth Coalition  
on AIDS in Myanmar (IYCA-Myanmar), 
Mizzima Youth Network, Interfaith 
Peace Network, and Myanmar Youth 
Resource Society (MYRS)—have held 
events promoting religious understand-
ing and nonviolence.38
Between 2004 and 2013, Physicians for 
Human Rights (PHR) documented sys-
tematic attacks by the Burmese military 
against the country’s minority ethnic 
groups in eight investigations in Burma 
and bordering countries.39 The attacks 
on Muslims in the past year are a con-
tinuation of that trend of targeting 
vulnerable groups. The Government of 
Burma has the responsibility to protect 
its citizens, and its failure to do so has 
created widespread impunity. Broad 
popular support for the atrocities,  
combined with this climate of impunity, 
has led anti-Rohingya attitudes to  
metastasize into anti-Muslim sentiment 
that has spread across the country.
In order to more deeply document the 
recent upsurge in anti-Muslim violence, 
PHR sent two researchers to Burma in 
March 2013 to investigate the situation 
in Rakhine State. While they were 
there, anti-Muslim violence erupted in 
Meiktila, Mandalay Division. The PHR 
researchers immediately traveled to 
Mandalay Division to conduct a prelimi-
nary investigation, and PHR sent a  
second team to do a forensic assessment 
of a massacre at a Muslim school in the 
Mingalar Zayyone quarter of Meiktila. 
PHR released an emergency report 
with detailed findings from the school 
massacre in May 2013, but the report 
did not cover the widespread and sys-
tematic nature of the current wave of 
anti-Muslim violence in Burma. This re-
port uses data from both investigations 
to demonstrate the broader nature of 
the rising tide of violence across the 
country.
Consistent patterns of behavior by  
government entities, and consistent 
patterns of abuse, may imply that  
police or military were following orders 
from their superiors, thus suggesting 
a government role in the abuses. 
Evidence of direct orders, funding 
streams, and material support remains 
elusive and requires additional indepen-
dent investigation. Even if there were 
no direct orders and high-level  
organization to promote abuse, the 
deeply engrained disdain for Muslims 
and other minorities that allowed  
for such patterns of human rights  
violations demonstrates a deep  
problem that the Government of 
Burma must address.
June 18, 2012
The Rohingya men arrested for the rape and 
murder of a Rakhine seamstress in May are 
sentenced to death. 
Rohingya Muslim 
children from 
Burma cry while 
kept under watch 
by Bangladeshi 
security officials 
after disembarking 
from an intercept-
ed boat in Teknaf, 
June 2012.  
Photo: MUNIR  
UZ ZAMAN/AFP/ 
GettyImages.
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8 Sites of Anti-Muslim Violence  
in Burma Since June 2012
Sitkwin
Tharyarwaddy
Win Kite
Thaketa
Minhla
Letpadan
Oakkan
Bago
Othegon
Rangoon
Nay Pyi Taw
Sittwe
Mandalay
Lashio
Hpakant
Meiktila
Mine Tauk
Mrauk U
Parein
Minbya
Pauktaw
Kyein Ni Pyin Camp
Dates of Violence
June–October 2012
February 2013
March 20–24, 2013
March 25–26, 2013
March 27–28, 2013
April 30, 2013
May 2013
June–July 2013
Myebon
Kyauk Phyu
Toungup Township
Thandwe
Yamethin
Tatkon
Shwe Dar
Padigon
Zigon
Okpho
Thegon
Nattalin
Gyobingauk
Tharsi
Maungdaw Township
Buthidaung
Mawlamyine
Kawkareik
Key
China
Thailand
LaosBangladesh
India
100 km
Major City
 
June 25, 2012
Security forces begin resettling displaced 
Rohingyas in Rakhine State’s capital  
of Sittwe.
July 2, 2012
Thirty people are arrested in connection  
with the murder of the 10 Muslims on  
June 3.
July 5, 2012
Ten aid workers are detained by the Burmese 
government in Rakhine State, some of whom 
are charged with criminal offenses.
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T
he findings of this report are 
based on field investigations 
conducted by Physicians 
for Human Rights (PHR) in 
Burma from March 22 to 
March 29, 2013 and from 
April 20 to May 2, 2013. The PHR team 
consisted of Richard Sollom, MA, MPH, 
former PHR director of emergencies; 
and Holly Atkinson, MD, FACP. The 
team interviewed 71 people in total,  
including Muslim, Buddhist, and 
Christian community leaders, as well as 
victims and witnesses of the violence.
In the Sittwe displaced persons camps, 
PHR investigators used modified 
chain-referral sampling to identify  
internally displaced persons (IDPs) from 
each village or quarter in Sittwe who 
were living in the camps. Chain-referral 
sampling is a technique that enables  
researchers to identify subgroups of 
people based on referrals from other 
participants in the survey.40 PHR  
researchers conducted in-depth inter-
views with 32 people from six rural 
villages and 12 neighborhoods in the 
town of Sittwe, addressing a total of  
18 geographic locations where sepa-
rate incidents of violence had occurred.
PHR researchers used similar methods 
in central Burma to identify victims and 
witnesses of human rights violations. 
In central Burma, PHR interviewed 39 
people in the cities and surrounding 
villages of Mandalay, Meiktila, Nay Pyi 
Taw, and Rangoon (Yangon).
PHR researchers sought eyewitnesses 
from as many different locations where 
outbreaks of violence occurred as was 
possible, given logistical and security 
constraints. By taking this approach, 
PHR researchers were able to identify 
patterns of human rights abuses, ex-
amining how the police, military, and 
Buddhist monks behaved in different 
locations.
PHR epidemiologists have used such 
pattern identification in prior investi-
gations elsewhere in Burma—as well 
as in Afghanistan, Darfur, Kosovo, and 
Sierra Leone—to examine whether the 
government or military played an active 
role in the perpetration of human rights 
abuses.41 
July 11, 2012
The Myanmar National Human Rights 
Commission reports no abuses by security 
forces during violence in June, states all  
aid needs are being met, and does not 
acknowledge the plight or existence of 
Rohingyas.
July 12, 2012
President Thein Sein announces that the  
“only solution” to the inter-ethnic violence  
is to send all 800,000 Rohingyas to other 
countries or put them in camps run by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR rejects  
the proposal.
August 4, 2012
UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights 
in Burma Tomás Ojea Quintana calls for an 
investigation into the June violence in Rakhine 
State over allegations of human rights abuses.
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10 Protecting Witnesses Limitations
G
iven the sensitive nature 
of this research and the 
risk of community or  
government reprisals 
against witnesses, PHR 
investigators made every 
effort to protect the identities of the 
interview subjects. PHR researchers did 
not record names, nor did they make 
audio or video recordings of the inter-
views. They conducted interviews with 
only one interpreter in private areas out 
of sight and earshot of passersby.
PHR investigators obtained informed 
oral consent from each participant fol-
lowing a detailed explanation of PHR, 
the purpose of the investigation, and 
the potential benefits and risks of  
participation. Oral rather than written 
consent was obtained to ensure  
anonymity and security. In the case of 
a minor, permission was also obtained 
orally from the child’s parent or  
guardian to ensure that he or she 
was confident that the safety, rights, 
and interests of the child were being 
safeguarded during the interview. 
Participants could stop the interview  
at any time or refuse to answer  
any questions.
PHR investigators employed additional 
safeguards for respondents under 12 
years of age: the investigators listened 
to their uninterrupted narrations and 
did not ask probing questions. Those 
interactions were kept purposefully 
short. In each interview with respon-
dents under 12 years of age, at least 
one parent was either present or  
nearby during the interview. Interviews 
were halted if the child became  
distraught in any way. Of the nine  
interviews conducted with minors who 
were eyewitnesses, the PHR field team 
terminated three of them early because 
of emotional distress.
D
ue to security concerns, 
PHR was unable to ac-
cess internally displaced 
persons (IDP) camps in 
Rakhine State that were 
further inland from Sittwe 
or to interview Muslims in the north-
ern Rakhine towns of Maungdaw or 
Buthidaung. For security and logistical 
reasons, PHR investigators also were 
unable to access all of the towns where 
violence had occurred, and thus could 
not speak with eyewitnesses about the 
violence that had occurred in those 
areas. Because PHR did not use random 
sampling to identify victims of abuses, 
these data may not be representative 
and cannot be extrapolated to a larger 
population.
PHR’s Ethical Review Board (ERB) ap-
proved this research. PHR has had an 
ERB since 1996 to ensure protection 
of human subjects in its research and 
investigations. PHR’s ERB regulations 
are based on Title 45 CRF Part 46 (see: 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/45c-
fr46.html) provisions, which are used by 
academic Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs). All of PHR’s research and investi-
gations involving human subjects must 
be approved by the ERB and conducted 
in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki as revised in 2000.
August 17, 2012
President Thein Sein announces the creation 
of a 27-member commission to investigate 
the causes of the sectarian violence that oc-
curred in June.
October 15, 2012
Thousands of Buddhist monks march in pro-
test over of the establishment of an office for 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
in Rakhine State. 
President Thein Sein’s office announces that 
it will not permit the OIC to have a presence 
in Burma.
Buddhist monks take part in a demonstration against  
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Rangoon  
on October 15, 2012.  
Photo: Ye Aung Thu/AFP/GettyImages
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A
s the descriptions  
below demonstrate, 
the patterns of violence 
against Muslims tend to 
stem from one “incit-
ing incident.” In several 
geographic locations, word of these 
initial incidents spread widely and led 
to extreme violence. An overview of 
the violence across the country allows 
several discernible patterns to emerge. 
Often the initial incident that leads to 
future violence includes elements of 
sexual violence or an attack on a reli-
gious figure—acts that can promote 
feelings of ethnic or religious purity. 
Whether these initial acts are violent or 
innocuous, the retaliatory attacks tend 
to target an entire community and not 
the individual perpetrators of that par-
ticular inciting incident.
PHR was not able to determine  
whether arrests and convictions were 
carried out in a manner consistent with 
internationally-established norms of 
police work or rule of law. Convictions 
can only be an indicator of justice 
if these norms are upheld, and the 
Government of Burma is notorious 
for jailing people without cause. The 
convictions in Burma may be a sign that 
the government is taking action to stop 
the violence; however, the international 
community should not use these num-
bers as the only measure of progress 
on this front.
Rakhine State:  
June 8–10, 2012
The violence in Rakhine State in June 
2012 started when a group of men 
allegedly raped and murdered a 
27-year-old Rakhine seamstress.42 Three 
Muslim men were arrested the next day 
for the crime.43 On June 3, some 300 
Buddhists pulled 10 Muslims from a bus 
and lynched them in a retaliatory at-
tack.44 Prior to the lynching, pamphlets 
were handed out in Rakhine State, 
calling for retribution for the murder 
of the Buddhist woman.45 On June 8, 
Rohingyas rioted after Friday prayers, 
resulting in the destruction of numerous 
homes and the death of seven people, 
four of whom were Rakhine.46 Over the 
next four days, the violence quickly es-
calated as it spread to other townships 
across Rakhine State. Rohingyas and 
other Muslims reported that security 
forces and Rakhine mobs subjected 
them to discriminatory and arbitrary  
arrests, physical attacks, rape, killing, 
and destruction of property.47
PHR documented multiple instances of 
police attacking Rohingyas, providing 
covering fire for Rakhine mobs that 
were attacking Rohingyas, and watch-
ing while Rohingyas were attacked. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar 
stated that 1,100 people were detained 
in relation to the June 2012 violence 
and subsequent violence in October, 
the “vast majority” of whom were 
Rohingya men and boys.48 In an August 
2012 presentation, Burma’s Ministry of 
Border Affairs stated that 858 people 
were detained in Rakhine State after 
the violence in June; 734 of those 
people are Rohingyas (listed by the 
government as “Bengali”).49 Official 
government documents use the term 
“Bengali” to refer to Rohingyas, reflect-
ing the government’s allegations that 
Rohingyas come from Bangladesh and 
have little claim to Burmese citizenship.
October 21, 2012
Violence erupts throughout Rakhine State. 
Security forces reportedly stand by as  
Rakhine mobs attack Rohingya villages  
and neighborhoods, killing inhabitants  
and burning down houses. 
October 27, 2012
President Thein Sein acknowledges  
that whole villages were burned down  
in Rakhine State.
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Burma’s president, Thein Sein.  
Photo: JEWEL SAMAD/AFP/Getty Images
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Rakhine State:  
October 21–24, 2012
After a mob killed a Rakhine merchant 
for selling rice to Muslim customers  
in Mrauk U on October 21, a wave 
of violence spread to nine townships 
within three days. Witnesses described 
thousands of armed Rakhines descend-
ing on Muslim towns and villages,  
burning houses as the inhabitants 
fled.50 Entire villages, neighborhoods, 
townships, and cities, including Sittwe, 
were emptied of Muslims; those 
who fled were forced into makeshift 
camps.51 Over 35,000 people were 
displaced by this round of violence, 
more than 97 percent of whom were 
Muslim.52 
On December 8, 2012, then minister 
of border affairs, Lieutenant-General 
Thein Htay, released the official number 
of those detained in connection with 
the violence in June and October in 
Rakhine State. The minister stated that 
1,121 people in 12 townships had been 
detained, 849 of whom were Rohingya 
(listed as “Bengali”), 233 were Rakhine, 
27 were Hindu, eight were Burmese 
(listed as “Myanmar”), and four were 
Maramagyi.53 Prisoners were reportedly 
refused bail or access to legal counsel.54 
In February 2013, a report released by 
the Democratic Voice of Burma stated 
that 966 Rohingyas have remained 
incarcerated since November 2012.55 
The detained Rohingyas were more 
likely to face charges carrying sentenc-
es of up to 13 years, while detained 
Rakhines allegedly faced charges that 
carry sentences of 6 months to a year.56 
As of February 2013, 68 people had 
reportedly died while in custody, 62 of 
whom were detained in Buthidaung 
prison.57 Four Rakhines suspected of 
involvement in the October violence 
were released in April 2013.58 On July 
9, 2013, senior Burmese government 
officials stated that 1,169 people had 
been arrested in connection with the 
violence in Rakhine State, and that 507 
had been convicted in 195 court cases, 
while 662 others were still on trial in 
45 other cases. There was no indication 
of the religious or ethnic breakdown of 
those arrested.59
The Burmese government’s combined 
estimates of those killed during the 
June and October 2012 violence range 
from 17660 to 211 people,61 with all 
estimates indicating that proportionally 
many more Rohingya were killed.62 
In contrast, Rakhine State’s National 
Democratic Party for Development 
reports that more than 500 people 
were killed in October 2012 alone.63 
According to Burmese officials, the  
violence in October left 89 people dead, 
136 injured, and over 5,300 houses and 
religious buildings destroyed.64 As of 
May 2013, as many as 140,000 inter-
nally displaced persons (IDP) resided in 
89 locations across Rakhine State.65
Rangoon:  
February 2013
Several hundred Buddhist nationalists 
attacked a Muslim school and businesses 
in the Thaketa Township of Rangoon  
in February 2013. The mob had mis-
takenly thought the school was being 
turned into a mosque after it requested 
permission to make repairs to the roof.66
Police reported that they detained  
four people after the attacks, but all 
were released shortly thereafter.67  
Thus far, no other reports have been  
released to indicate additional  
detentions or arrests.
October 28, 2012
Over 35,000 people displaced by  
violence that started on October 21  
increase the total number of IDPs in  
Rakhine to 100,000; nearly all are Muslim.
A Rohingya girl 
stands next to a 
shelter in an  
unregistered/ 
unofficial IDP camp  
near Sittwe.
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Mandalay & Bago Divisions:  
March 26–29, 2013
The violence in Mandalay reportedly  
started with a quarrel between a 
Buddhist couple and the employees of 
a Muslim-owned gold shop over the 
value of a gold hair clip in the city of 
Meiktila. The argument became phys-
ical as the employees reportedly beat 
the husband in the street; police arrived 
and detained the owner of the shop 
and the Buddhist woman.68 Onlookers 
became enraged and destroyed the 
gold shop, as well as several other 
Muslim-owned shops nearby while 
reportedly shouting anti-Muslim slurs.69 
In retaliation, a group of local Muslims 
reportedly killed a Buddhist monk. 
As news of the monk’s death spread, 
mobs of Buddhists attacked Muslims in 
the city and destroyed Muslim homes, 
religious buildings, and shops.70 The 
violence continued for several days as 
it spread to other villages in Mandalay 
Division and south to Bago Division.71 
Eyewitnesses told PHR that over the 
course of three days, 12 of Meiktila’s  
13 mosques were destroyed, along 
with 1,500 homes.72 Witnesses told 
PHR that in the days leading up to 
the violence, the number “786” was 
spray-painted on Muslim homes.73 
This number—which is significant to 
Muslims in the region74—was apparent-
ly used in this particular case to identify 
homes to be attacked.75 
One eyewitness to the violence in 
Meiktila told PHR that one week before 
the fighting, Buddhists throughout 
the city had put 969 stickers on their 
homes. He said groups of people 
October 29, 2012
Explosions reportedly caused by hand  
grenades occur at two mosques in  
Kawkareik Township in Karen State. 
November 1, 2012
Thousands of Rohingyas in Pauktaw 
Township refuse to sign government  
registration forms because authorities re-
placed the term “Rohingya” with “Bengali.”
November 4, 2012
Doctors Without Borders reports that  
pamphlets and posters being distributed  
in Sittwe threaten any aid workers who  
treat Muslims. 
Mobs destroyed 
the school and 
mosque in the 
Mingalar Zayyone 
quarter of Meiktila, 
site of the massacre 
of scores of 
students, teachers, 
and residents.  
Photo: Heim Aung
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were going door-to-door and giving 
Buddhists stickers to mark their homes 
so that they would not be targeted for 
burning.76 Eyewitnesses told PHR  
that they saw monks instigating the  
violence, some carrying weapons.77
PHR interviewed eyewitnesses who said 
police watched without trying to in-
tervene while Muslims were killed and 
their homes and mosques burned.78 
The number of people arrested for the 
Meiktila violence varies considerably 
among sources. Mandalay Region 
Advocate General Ye Aung Myint  
reported on May 27 that 87 people had 
been arrested in connection with the 
events in Mandalay, 38 of whom are 
Buddhist.79 In a briefing on April 3, the 
minister for foreign affairs stated that 
142 people had been detained and  
that action was being taken against 
32 perpetrators of the violence in 
Mandalay and Bago.80 The police stated 
that 70 people had been arrested, in-
cluding 28 Muslims and 42 Buddhists.81 
Witnesses reported that Burmese  
authorities questioned and then  
released a number of those arrested.82
As of the writing of this report, the 
government had arrested 44 people, 
both Muslims and Buddhists, for inci-
dents that occurred in Meiktila. In April 
2013, the gold shop owner, his wife, 
and an employee were sentenced to 
14 years each for assault and theft.83 In 
May, seven Muslim men were convicted 
on various charges for the killing of the 
Buddhist monk, receiving sentences of 
2 to 28 years in prison.84 In July, two 
Buddhists were sentenced to seven 
years for murder committed during 
the riots.85 Between July 9 and July 11, 
2013, 25 Buddhists and four Muslims 
were convicted for crimes committed 
during the violence in Meiktila.86 The  
25 Buddhists were sentenced on  
several charges, including arson, incit-
ing unrest, assault, theft, and murder;87 
those convicted of murder received 
10 to 15 years in prison.88 The four 
Muslims received sentences ranging 
from seven years to life imprisonment 
for their roles in one murder specifical-
ly.89 On July 12, one Buddhist and two 
Muslims were sentenced to five years 
imprisonment for arson and destruction 
of property.90 One student activist from 
Rakhine State, Ye Min Oo, was facing 
six years in prison for “sedition and 
inciting religious hatred” during the 
violence in Meiktila; he was arrested on 
March 25, but no verdict had been giv-
en as of the writing of this report.91 
Some positive stories have emerged from 
this new chapter of atrocities in Burma. 
Civil society groups are leading efforts to 
build peace and social reconciliation; the 
government can learn much from these 
groups. The Interfaith Youth Coalition 
on AIDS in Myanmar (IYCA-Myanmar), 
Mizzima Youth Network, Interfaith Peace 
Network, Myanmar Youth Resource 
Society (MYRS), and other Burma-based 
groups have held several events promot-
ing religious understanding and nonvi-
olence.92 In addition, PHR interviewed 
Muslim victims of the violence in Sittwe 
who spoke of groups and individuals who 
protected them. For example, a Rohingya 
person described how Rakhine staff of 
the Myanmar Red Cross stopped Rakhine 
mobs from beating them, provided 
treatment, and evacuated them to the 
hospital.93 Other Muslim victims said that 
their Buddhist neighbors hid them from 
the mobs and helped them escape the 
fighting.94 A Burman policeman diverted 
Rakhine mobs from one Muslim section 
of town, enabling Rohingyas to escape 
unharmed.95 PHR documented two  
occasions in which Buddhist monks tried 
to intervene to stop the violence.96
Acts of Courage 
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November 15, 2012
The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian  
Affairs (UN OCHA) announces that  
115,000 displaced persons are in  
58 locations in Rakhine State, more  
than half of them located near Sittwe.
November 17, 2012
Satellite evidence obtained after the violence 
in October shows the complete destruction 
of Rohingya villages and neighborhoods 
throughout Rakhine State.
November 17, 2012
President Thein Sein promises to address 
the underlying problems of the violence in 
Rakhine State in a televised address and letter 
to the UN.
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At the time this report was written,  
44 people had been convicted in total, 
28 of whom were Buddhist (sentences 
ranging from 3 to 15 years).97 
Police in Bago Division claim that they 
have arrested between 50 and 60 
people thought to have participated 
in vandalizing homes and property.98 
In the town of Moenyo, only 4 people 
have reportedly been questioned in 
connection with the riots, while 21 
people have been detained for violat-
ing the curfew put in place during the 
violence.99 Ten people were reportedly 
convicted for violating the curfew and 
sentenced to three months in prison.100 
One Muslim was sentenced to two 
years for “insulting” religion after  
removing a 969 sticker from a shop  
in Bago Division on April 20. He was 
tried two days after the incident and 
sentenced the following day.101
Oakkan, Rangoon Division:  
April 30–May 1, 2013 
The violence in Oakkan and the sur-
rounding areas reportedly started after 
a Muslim woman bumped into an 
11-year-old novice monk, causing him 
to drop and damage his alms bowl.102 
After police detained the woman, 
rumors spread that Muslim residents 
were going to mount a revenge attack. 
Mobs of armed Buddhists formed 
with the supposed intent of catching 
Muslims by surprise, descending on 
Muslim villages in the surrounding 
area.103 Residents described groups of 
200 to 300 armed Buddhists driving 
into villages on motorcycles and de-
stroying homes and mosques.104 Some 
of the attackers were purportedly local 
residents, while others were likely from 
elsewhere.105
Twenty-one people were arrested in 
connection with the violence in Oakkan 
and the surrounding villages in May 
2013.106 The woman who allegedly 
bumped into the novice monk was 
among those arrested and was charged 
with insulting religion through “delib-
erate and malicious acts.”107 She and 
another Muslim woman have been 
convicted and sentenced to two years 
of hard labor.108 No one else had been 
convicted at the time this report was 
written. 
Hpakant, Kachin State:  
May 4, 2013
A group of approximately 30 Buddhists 
attacked Muslim-owned shops and 
houses in three areas of Hpakant 
Township on May 4, 2013. There are  
no reports of what may have sparked 
the outbreak of violence.109
Two Buddhists were subsequently de-
tained, but there had been no additional 
arrests, charges filed, or convictions 
when this report was written.110
Lashio, Shan State:  
May 28–29, 2013
The violence in Lashio reportedly 
started after a Muslim man got into a 
quarrel with a female Buddhist gaso-
line vendor.111 In the ensuing fight, the 
Muslim man poured gasoline on the 
vendor and lit her on fire.112 The suspect 
was detained by police soon thereafter. 
A mob formed around the police sta-
tion demanding that the police release 
the man to them. When the police  
refused, the mob burned a mosque.113 
The violence escalated from there, as 
mobs of armed men roamed the streets 
on motorcycles, while a group of men 
in the market reportedly cheered and 
sang nationalist Burmese songs as they 
destroyed shops.114 Journalists and  
humanitarian aid workers reported 
being threatened and attacked by the 
crowds during the violence.115 
December 7, 2012
Following a four-day visit to Burma, Valerie 
Amos, UN under-secretary-general for  
humanitarian affairs, states that the situation 
for IDPs in Rakhine State is “dire.”
December 24, 2012
The UN General Assembly unanimously  
approves a non-binding resolution expressing 
concern over violence in Rakhine State and 
advocates that Burma protect the rights of 
Rohingyas.
February 11, 2013
Government authorities instruct immigration 
officials in Rakhine State to prevent Muslims 
from moving outside their townships.
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Shan State government spokesperson, 
Wai Lin, stated that 44 people were 
arrested in connection with the vio-
lence in Lashio, most of whom were 
Buddhists.116 Police spokesman, Major 
Moe Zaw Linn, stated that 60 people 
were arrested during the violence.117 
Fourteen people were still on trial for 
their involvement in the violence as 
of mid-June, with additional suspects 
reportedly under arrest.118 However, 
the only person convicted so far is the 
Muslim man accused of setting fire to 
the Buddhist petrol vendor; he was 
sentenced to 26 years in prison for 
attempted murder, causing grievous 
harm, and two separate drug-related 
crimes.119
Mone, Bago Division:  
May 29, 2013
This bout of violence was reportedly 
triggered by a fight between two 
brothers-in-law, one Muslim and one 
Buddhist, during which the latter was 
supposedly injured.120 Both were taken 
to the police station, after which res-
idents reportedly stated that a crowd 
of Buddhists surrounded the station 
and demanded that the Muslim man 
be charged with a serious crime.121 
Afterward, the crowd destroyed a 
mosque and madrassa.122
As of the writing of this report, no ar-
rests had been reported in connection 
with this violence.123
Thandwe, Rakhine State:  
June 30–July 1, 2013
The unrest was reportedly sparked after 
word spread that one or two men—
who were purportedly Muslim—raped 
a woman.124 After hearing the news, 
a mob of 50 people reportedly gath-
ered outside of a police station and 
went on to destroy several Muslim-
owned homes and injure three Kaman 
Muslims.125 The next day, the mob 
burned down another Muslim-owned 
home.126 
As of July 2013, only one Muslim man 
accused of rape had been arrested.127
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February 16, 2013
UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana 
condemns the Burmese government’s treat-
ment of the Rohingyas.
The overall culture of impunity 
demands sweeping legal reforms and  
a concerted initiative by political  
and civil society leadership in Burma.
UN Special Rap-
porteur Tomás Ojea 
Quintana talks to 
the media following 
a press briefing 
on the situation in 
Rakhine State.  
Photo: Ye Aung Thu/
AFP/GettyImages
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B
etween June 2012 and July 
2013, attacks on Muslims 
occurred in dozens of towns 
across Burma. PHR investi-
gators interviewed 89 key 
informants and eyewitnesses 
to the incidents in 19 locations across 
Rakhine State, Mandalay Division, and 
in the city of Rangoon. Several patterns 
that emerged from these interviews 
suggest that the violence now spread-
ing throughout Burma might represent 
more than random acts of communal 
violence, and instead might have been 
instigated and sustained by anti-Muslim 
groups. Patterns of neglecting the vi-
olence are evident in the government 
response across the broader geography 
of the attacks. The apparent failure of 
authorities to respond appropriately 
and in a manner that protects human 
rights of all persons also indicates pos-
sible collusion in the violence. In each 
situation, PHR documented the failure 
to protect civilians and prosecute per-
petrators. The overall culture of impu-
nity demands sweeping legal reforms 
and a concerted initiative by political 
and civil society leadership in Burma. 
The especially egregious actions by po-
lice and military units in Rakhine State, 
combined with an overall absence of 
the rule of law, enabled the violence to 
spread to other areas of the country. 
The patterns evident in PHR’s primary 
data are reflected in reports by jour-
nalists and by other human rights in-
vestigators who have traveled to other 
sites of violence in Burma where PHR 
did not go. To highlight the similarities 
of events across Burma, this section 
presents PHR’s findings in parallel with 
reports from other areas of the country, 
categorized by human rights violation. 
February 18, 2013
Several hundred Buddhist nationalists attack a 
Muslim school and businesses in the Thaketa 
Township of Rangoon.
February 20, 2013
In northern Maungdaw Township,  
13 Rohingya women and girls are beaten  
and gang-raped by the Nasaka, Burma’s  
border security force.
February 21, 2013
Deputy minister of immigration and popu-
lation denies the existence of the Rohingya 
ethnic group in Burma during a parliamentary 
question session. 
Residents look 
at the charred 
remains of burnt 
bodies in riot-hit 
Meiktila on March 
23, 2013.  
Photo: Soe Than 
WIN/AFP/Getty 
Images
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Burmese Authorities Fail to Protect 
Civilians from Assault128 
“There is no help from the government. 
The government is looking at us as an 
enemy.”129  
– Community leader, Sittwe IDP camps
Police and military actions during the  
violence followed similar patterns 
across the country. Eyewitnesses from 
13 of the 17 locations where PHR in-
vestigated in Rakhine State said they 
saw police during the attacks. In those 
13 locations, police were seen firing 
weapons into crowds in eight separate 
sites,130 and were seen watching but not 
intervening four times.131 Eyewitnesses 
told PHR that police sometimes fired 
into the air and other times fired directly 
at people, sometimes killing those in 
the crowd.132 In only two situations 
did police intervene to help evacuate 
injured Muslims.133 In some cases, the 
police did nothing at first, but later 
helped move Muslims to safety.134 
The army’s record was only slightly 
better. PHR documented nine times 
in which military troops were seen 
during outbreaks of violence. On two 
occasions, troops fired their weapons 
at Muslims,135 on three occasions they 
did nothing to stop the violence,136 and 
in six cases they evacuated wounded 
Muslims to hospitals or trucked them to 
IDP camps.137
Witnesses of the violence in Kyauk 
Phyu, Meiktila, and Rangoon told PHR 
that local government officials warned 
Rohingyas not to attack Rakhines 
and said that they could not protect 
Muslims.138 Although local authorities 
knew in advance that violence would 
erupt, they did nothing to prevent it.
“During the violence, we had no pro-
tection from the police. But we got 
some help, but only a little, from the 
army—to take us to the hospital.”139  
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps
“Before [Rakhine people] attacked our 
village, they destroyed our boats, so 
we couldn’t escape. The next morning, 
some military came, a battalion from 
Mrauk U. They said, ‘We’ll tell the 
Rakhine not to attack you again.’  
We had no food, so many women  
from the village went out to find 
food—not men; they were afraid they 
would be killed by Rakhines. Three 
days later, the army and Rakhine 
people came into the village, and the 
army watched while Rakhines looted 
our houses. We lived like this for two 
months; we ate grass as food. When 
the army came the last time they said, 
‘We only have a few more days to  
protect you, so it is better for you to  
go away, go to another place.’”140  
– Female IDP, Sittwe camps
June 2012, Rakhine State,  
PHR Field Reporting 
Key informants told PHR they saw  
police stand back and watch as Than 
Daw Li village and Narzi quarter erupted 
in flames.141 One key informant told 
PHR that state-owned equipment was 
used to destroy mosques and Rohingya 
homes, stating: “They smashed  
everything with a bulldozer; it was a 
government bulldozer from a jetty.”142 
Other key informants told PHR that 
they called state authorities to ask  
for protection when armed mobs  
of Rakhine people arrived in their 
neighborhoods, but that authorities 
took no action.143
March 20, 2013
Buddhist mobs attack Muslim quarters in  
the city of Meiktila following a dispute 
between a Muslim gold shop owner and 
Buddhist customers.
The entire Muslim 
Mingalar Zayyone  
quarter was totally 
destroyed as part 
of the anti-Muslim 
violence that swept 
through Meiktila in 
late March 2013.  
Photo: Heim Aung
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October 2012, Rakhine State,  
PHR Field Reporting
Approximately 60 miles down the coast 
from Sittwe, police and Army Battalion 
34, commanded by a Burman,144 
were positioned around the Muslim 
quarter in the town of Kyauk Phyu. 
Muslims from Kyauk Phyu told PHR 
that they were grateful for the pro-
tection and sent food and presents 
to the police and soldiers.145 The local 
government then replaced Battalion 
34 with Battalion 543, commanded by 
a Rakhine.146 The Kyauk Phyu district 
government also warned Rohingyas to 
refrain from retaliating against the at-
tacks.147 One eyewitness told PHR, “We 
called on the phone to Kyauk Phyu 
district government for help. They said, 
‘If you burn one Rakhine house, then 
you will be killed.’”148 Eyewitnesses told 
PHR that on October 23, once the vio-
lence had started, police and Battalion 
543 provided covering fire for Rakhines 
who were throwing Molotov cocktails 
at Muslim houses.149 Several Rohingyas 
were wounded and killed.150 
“Before the violence, we heard that 
Rakhines would attack us—there was 
talking at the market. I was afraid.  
The local government told us not to 
attack the Rakhines—that the Rakhines 
would burn our houses if we did. The 
Union Solidarity and Development 
Party (USDP) district government sent 
us a letter; it said, ‘Muslim people, 
don’t attack Rakhines or they will burn 
your house.’”151  
– Male farmer, Kyauk Phyu
March 2013, Mandalay Division, 
PHR Field Reporting
PHR spoke with eyewitnesses of the 
violence in Meiktila in March 2013 
who saw police stand by as crowds 
destroyed Muslim homes, schools, and 
businesses. PHR’s May 2013 report, 
Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim 
Students Terrorized and Killed in 
Meiktila, documented that police  
watched while groups of armed 
Buddhists killed at least 20 children  
and four teachers.152
PHR also spoke with eyewitnesses from 
Mandalay Division who saw police fail 
to act as mobs attacked their communi-
ties. One male resident of Meiktila saw 
a crowd form near a police station and 
start to move toward the market. He 
joined this group of people and reported 
getting trapped in the crowd, where he 
counted approximately 10 monks,  
five of whom he saw handing out iron 
bars to people. This eyewitness also 
saw fires in several Muslim storefronts, 
and said that the monks blocked the 
passage of fire trucks that arrived on 
the scene. He reported that he ob-
served several policemen who stood  
at the scene and watched.153
This eyewitness also said that when 
he tried to take a video of the scene, 
he heard a man yell, “There’s a Kalar 
[a derogatory term for Muslim]; he’s 
taking photos of us.” Eight people then 
began attacking him with sticks. He 
said that two of the policemen who 
were standing in front of him grabbed 
his arms, pulled him up, and took him 
to the nearby police station. The eye-
witness stated that, en route to the  
station, people in the crowd hit him 
with bars, and the police did little to 
stop them. PHR researchers noted that 
this eyewitness had very obvious  
periorbital ecchymoses (black eyes),  
and a deviated nasal bridge, which  
was presumably broken. He was still 
suffering from severe back pain from 
where he was struck with iron bars.154 
March 21, 2013
At least 20 students and four teachers are  
reportedly killed by a Buddhist mob that  
attacked a madrassa in the Mingalar Zayyone 
quarter of Meiktila. 
March 24, 2013
Violence in central Burma spreads as mobs at-
tack Muslim homes, businesses, and mosques 
in towns outside Meiktila and Rangoon.
March 26, 2013
The official death toll from the violence in 
Meiktila is raised to 40. UN Special Adviser 
on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng 
voices concern over the violence.
Anti-Muslim violence spreads to several  
villages in Bago Division, resulting in the 
destruction of mosques, shops, and homes. 
Many Muslims in the villages are forced  
to flee.
Human Rights Violations
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PHR interviewed one female head of 
household who was stopped twice by 
police while attempting to flee from  
violence in her village, during which 
time she witnessed police verbally 
authorizing armed civilians to attack 
Muslim neighborhoods for a period  
of 30 minutes. She said she tried to 
drive her children and grandchildren 
out of her village on the evening of 
March 23 after witnessing “about  
40 to 50 people” attack Muslim shops 
and light fires. Police officers stopped 
her at a roadblock and told her to turn 
around and go home. When she began 
to drive back toward her village, she 
saw violence spreading in the direc-
tion of her home and drove back to 
the checkpoint. She then overheard a 
group of men on the roadside talking 
to a policeman who appeared to be in 
charge of the checkpoint. She heard 
the policeman say to the group of men, 
armed with sticks, that he would give 
the group 30 minutes to loot and burn 
Muslim businesses, but then he’d “have 
to do something.” At this point, she 
was allowed through the checkpoint, 
but the police officer threatened her by 
saying, “If you tell anyone about what 
you saw, we’ll come find you and beat 
you.”155
“As we drove out of town I saw a 
mosque burning and a fire truck. 
People were blocking the fire truck 
from reaching the mosque.”156  
– Female IDP, Meiktila
Reports from Elsewhere in Burma
Journalists detailing the Lashio riots in 
May 2013 recounted a similar pattern, 
reporting that the fire brigades did 
not respond to burning buildings; they 
claimed they were not ordered to re-
spond to the fires so they did not go.157
Legal Analysis
Internationally accepted police guide-
lines obligate police officials to protect 
all persons against illegal acts,158  
thereby obliging police to intervene 
when witness to unlawful destruction  
and threats to civilian lives. In the 
Burmese context, police and military 
incompetence or timidity cannot be 
an explanation for their reluctance 
to act. Throughout Burma’s history, 
and especially during pro-democracy 
protests in 1988 and 2007, police and 
military have disrupted civilian protests 
with brutal efficiency. In the last year, 
government forces put down peaceful 
protests and arrested protestors in 
Letpaudaung, Maday Island, Mandalay, 
Rangoon, Lashio, and Shwebo.159 The 
police force should operate as an insti-
tution that protects civilians, not one 
that only reacts to peaceful protests 
deemed threatening to the state.
March 28, 2013
President Thein Sein warns potential instiga-
tors of violence that he has the ability and 
resolve to use force to protect citizens.
March 29, 2013
A mob of around 50 men attacks a Muslim 
neighborhood in the Gyobingauk Township 
of Bago Division, causing hundreds of 
Muslims to flee.
April 2, 2013
In Rangoon, 13 boys die in a fire at a madras-
sa. Burmese officials say that the fire was an 
accident, but people close to the school claim 
that foul play was involved. 
The police force should operate as an 
institution that protects civilians, not one
that only reacts to peaceful protests
deemed threatening to the state.
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Burmese Authorities Fired on and 
Arbitrarily Executed Civilians in 
Rakhine State160
Police in Rakhine State failed to protect 
Rohingyas during the violence there. 
Police also fired deadly weapons at 
Rohingyas to prevent them from de-
fending their property against mobs of 
armed Rakhines. In the incidents that 
PHR investigated, Rohingyas sometimes 
defended themselves and their property 
with knives, sticks, or other rudimen-
tary weapons. Even though Rohingyas 
were armed at times, the response by 
police was excessive and appears to 
have amounted to arbitrary execution 
in some cases.
June 2012, Rakhine State,  
PHR Field Reporting 
“Before the burning, Army Battalion 
542 fired onto the roofs of the 
Rohingya houses. Then Rakhines 
burned the houses with petrol 
bombs.”161  
– Male farmer, Kyauk Phyu
A middle-aged father told PHR that  
police watched while Rakhine peo-
ple set fire to Rohingya homes in his 
community.162 He testified that on 
June 11, after Rakhine residents set 
fire to Rohingya houses, police shot at 
Rohingyas as they exited their burning 
homes.163 This same eyewitness told 
PHR that on the road to the IDP camp 
he witnessed police officials force a 
12-year-old boy to lie down face-up on 
the street, at which time police shot 
him once in the chest with a rifle.164  
The eyewitness claimed to have been 
about “three bamboo pole lengths” 
(approximately 100 feet) away from 
this shooting when it happened. 
Afterwards, he ran with his family  
away from the scene.165
In several cases, eyewitnesses told 
PHR that authorities provided covering 
fire for Rakhines who were burning 
Rohingya houses. Although Rohingyas 
tried to defend their property, they 
were turned back by gunfire. One  
eyewitness told PHR, “I saw Rakhine  
people throwing petrol bottles on 
the roof of a Rohingya house. The 
Rohingyas attacked them back. Then 
the police started shooting at the 
Rohingyas. Some were hit in the leg 
and some were hit on the body.”166 
Another eyewitness said, “Some 
Rakhine people were marching to the 
mosque and the madrassa. Our villagers 
tried to stop them by attacking, but the 
police shot at us. Four Rohingyas were 
killed; I saw all four get killed.”167
“When the Rakhines started burning 
our houses, we wanted to defend our-
selves. We attacked them with sticks 
and knives to make them stop. Then 
Lon Htein [police commandos] started 
shooting at people.”168  
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps
“I saw about 50 commando police 
come in first; they pointed guns at 
Rohingyas and fired. I saw about 
10 people killed. At the same time, 
Rakhines started burning the town. 
Later we retrieved the bodies.”169  
– Female IDP, Sittwe camps
April 5, 2013
A plan to resettle Rohingya IDPs in Kyauk 
Phyu Township is scrapped after local 
Rakhines oppose allowing Rohingyas to  
be resettled near them.
April 10, 2013
Dozens of people are arrested throughout 
Bago Division in connection with the  
anti-Muslim riots in March 2013.
April 11, 2013
A Muslim gold-shop owner, his wife, and an 
employee are sentenced to 14 years in prison 
for assault and theft during an altercation 
that sparked anti-Muslim violence in Meiktila.
Human Rights Violations
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Reports from Elsewhere in Burma
Most of the direct assaults on Muslims 
by Burmese authorities occurred in 
Rakhine State. The police failure to 
prevent anti-Muslim violence and arrest 
perpetrators in other parts of the coun-
try most likely played a role in enabling 
or even encouraging attacks. PHR did 
not independently verify any incidents 
of police or military shooting civilians 
outside of Rakhine State.
The only other reported case of 
police firing on civilians outside of 
Rakhine State was in Pyay Township 
in Mandalay, where people were in-
jured and hospitalized after being shot 
with rubber bullets on March 27, 2013 
during riots sparked by the Meiktila 
violence.170
Legal Analysis
The UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials limits police use 
of deadly force to those occasions 
when “strictly necessary and to the 
[minimum] extent required for the 
performance of… duty.”171 UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force further 
stipulate that law enforcement officials 
may only use firearms against people 
posing “imminent threat of death or se-
rious injury,” and even then only when 
less “extreme” means are insufficient 
means of protection.172
Forced Displacement173
Forced displacement exacts a devas-
tating toll on entire communities. Such 
displacement often involves the strip-
ping away of livelihoods, the loss  
of family and other interpersonal  
connections, the inability to access  
basic services, including health and 
education, and future vulnerability to 
human rights abuses.174
June and October 2012, Rakhine 
State, PHR Field Reporting
During the initial wave of violence in 
Sittwe, Muslims fled the fighting and 
gathered in Aung Mingala quarter, one 
of the largest Muslim quarters in town, 
seeking safety in numbers. After a few 
days, the population of the quarter 
swelled to several times its normal size. 
Local military commanders came to the 
quarter and said they would evacuate 
IDPs. According to eyewitnesses, the 
army sent six or seven trucks to move 
IDPs to the edge of town. These trucks 
dropped them off where the IDP camps 
are located today. Eyewitnesses said 
the relocation was voluntary because 
people feared for their lives and wanted 
to get out of Sittwe. Several thousand 
more people walked from the Aung 
Mingala quarter to the edge of town. 
Eyewitnesses said they were attacked 
by Rakhine civilians and monks as they 
fled, but were protected by the army. 
PHR interviewed Muslims who fled their 
homes during the June 2012 violence 
and were grateful to Burmese Army 
soldiers for protecting them.175
The army facilitated the exodus of all 
of the Muslims in the town of Sittwe, 
with the exception of those who chose 
to remain in Aung Mingala ghetto.176 
Aung Mingala remains the only Muslim 
quarter in Sittwe not burned to the 
ground and evacuated. The quarter is 
surrounded by police, and people are 
not permitted to enter or leave without 
paying a bribe. The army drove people 
out ostensibly for the Muslims’ safety, 
but the result was to concentrate the 
Muslim population in camps outside of 
town, where they have remained for 
over a year.  
One Rohingya woman told PHR that 
five days after violence began in Sittwe, 
police “kicked out” all Rohingya fam-
ilies from her village of Pauktaw and 
forced them toward the shore.177 
April 18, 2013
A Burmese government spokesperson rejects 
calls for an international investigation into the 
anti-Muslim violence, saying the violence is 
Burma’s “internal affairs.”
April 29, 2013
The Rakhine State Conflicts Investigation 
Commission calls for more security forces 
in Rakhine, segregation between Muslims 
and Buddhists, and limiting the population 
growth of Rohingyas.
April 30, 2013
Anti-Muslim mobs destroy several businesses, 
homes, and a mosque in Oakkan and sur-
rounding villages. At least one person is killed.
Human Rights Violations
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Burmese Authorities Promote 
Segregation and Prevent Muslims 
from Fulfilling Basic Needs178
June and October 2012, Rakhine 
State,179 PHR Field Reporting
PHR researchers documented several 
instances of government restrictions 
on freedom of movement. During the 
fighting, Rohingyas fleeing violence in 
Kyauk Phyu by boat were turned away 
from entering the IDP camps in Sittwe 
because authorities wanted them in a 
different camp. The Nasaka, Burma’s 
border security force, fired over fishing 
boats trying to land IDPs at the Sittwe 
beach and beat Rohingyas as they 
disembarked.180 
“[After we landed at Sittwe IDP camp,] 
the army called us. They said, ‘You 
can’t land here, go to Rathedaung.’ 
We said we did not want to go there, 
and they said, ’Talk to the prime minis-
ter of Rakhine State to see where you 
should go.’ We said, ‘We’re Kaman 
Muslims, we have citizenship, take us 
back to Kyauk Phyu.’ But the prime 
minister said no. They want to send us 
to difficult areas to discriminate against 
us. They are sending us there to get 
attacked by Rakhines again; these areas 
are not safe.”181  
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps
Rohingyas are even less safe outside 
the IDP camps, where they may be  
susceptible to attacks from civilians. 
The Burmese authorities are not  
forcing Rohingyas to stay in the camps, 
but because they will not give them 
protection if they leave, the Rohingyas 
have no choice but to remain there. 
Tomás Ojea Quintana, the UN special 
rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in Myanmar, visited these camps 
in February 2013 and said the camp in 
Myebon “felt more like a prison than 
an IDP camp.”182
“Nasaka will let us go [on boats to other 
countries] but will not let us return.”183 
– Community leader, Sittwe IDP camp
Because Rohingyas in the camps can-
not travel to the markets in Sittwe to 
buy food, those not receiving rations 
from the World Food Program (WFP) 
must rely on sympathetic Rakhine truck 
drivers to buy them food in the markets 
and deliver it to the camps. These truck 
drivers, who have been harassed by 
monks and beaten by Rakhine mobs in 
the markets, told PHR that they receive 
no protection from the police.184
“The Rakhines will kill Rohingyas if they 
go downtown. There is no government 
protection. We cannot go to the hospital, 
to the market.”185  
– Community leader, Sittwe IDP camp 
The Burmese police and military failed 
to protect Rohingyas from attacks 
during the 2012 violence, and they 
have not been able to provide protec-
tion since then. Rohingyas in the areas 
around Sittwe cannot travel freely  
outside of IDP camps. Most IDPs in 
Sittwe interviewed by PHR said they 
would return home to Sittwe if the 
government would guarantee their 
safety, though at the time of the  
interviews they felt this was not the 
case.186 One female IDP told PHR,  
“100 percent I want to go home to 
Sittwe if I can get safety and protec-
tion from the government. That is my 
home.”187
“I want to live in peace with the 
Rakhine people, like in the past.”188 
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps
“1982 [the citizenship law] is not for 
us. We need rights. This is our country 
too; we vote, and we have been elect-
ed. They don’t want to recognize us 
as citizens because we are Muslim.”189 
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps
May 1, 2013
A mob of about 100 Buddhists armed  
with sticks reportedly threatens to burn 
the Muslim village of Win Kite and kill its 
residents, but is pushed back to a nearby 
Buddhist village by police.
May 2, 2013
The U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedoms lists Burma as one of the 
worst offenders in denying religious freedom.
May 4, 2013
A crowd of 30 people destroys a  
Muslim-owned shop in Hpakant  
Township in Kachin State. Two  
Buddhists are arrested at the scene.
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PHR interviewed three groups of com-
munity leaders who lived in IDP camps 
near Sittwe, as well as community 
leaders who were organizing aid for 
IDPs in Meiktila. In the Sittwe camps, 
leaders complained of limited food 
supplies and a lack of shelter.190 IDPs in 
the camps near Sittwe who had regis-
tered with WFP received regular rations 
of rice, oil, and salt. Unregistered IDPs 
received food aid from private donors 
from Rangoon. Unregistered IDPs 
said these food rations did not come 
regularly, and they were constantly 
worried about running out of food.191 
PHR was not able to access all camps in 
Rakhine State, and some private donors 
in Rangoon told PHR that they could 
not visit particular camps because the 
government did not provide them with 
security from hostile local civilians.192
IDPs were living in canvas tents pro-
vided by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
in bamboo houses, and in grass-
thatched huts that were too low to 
permit standing. The IDP camps are 
interspersed with villages that existed 
before the displacement. Altogether, 
they cover about nine square miles. 
This area is located on a coastal plain—
an extremely flat site with no drainage. 
In many places, latrines were only a few 
yards from the houses.
Community leaders of one unregistered 
settlement of about 67 households said 
they had four water pumps—only two 
of which were working—and 10 toilets 
for their community. They said most of 
the children had diarrhea and malaria.193
PHR investigators were not able to visit 
camps for Rakhine IDPs in Sittwe, but 
observed them from nearby. These 
camps were much closer to the town 
of Sittwe, and all were made up of 
bamboo houses with iron sheets on the 
roofs; PHR investigators saw electric 
wires running into the houses and elec-
tric streetlights. PHR researchers also 
saw housing construction on the edge 
of the town of Sittwe, where locals said 
houses would be built for displaced 
Rakhine people. So far, there is no 
government plan to move Rohingyas or 
other Muslims out of the IDP camps.194
Muslim community leaders in Mandalay 
told PHR that they were raising mon-
ey to support Buddhist and Muslim 
IDPs. They said that the government 
asked them to build 1,100 homes for 
Muslims who had fled Meiktila, but 
that the government requested they 
use a contractor known to be a crony 
of the old regime. Community leaders 
said they were given 30 days to resettle 
an estimated 9,000 Muslim IDPs from 
Meiktila.195
May 7, 2013
The Dalai Lama denounces attacks on 
Muslims by Buddhist monks in Burma,  
saying that killing in the name of religion  
is “unthinkable.”
May 21 , 2013
Seven Muslims are convicted for crimes  
related to the violence in Meiktila in  
March and receive sentences ranging  
between 2 and 28 years in prison.
May 23 , 2013
Seven Rohingya are charged with criminal 
offenses after they are arrested for refusing to 
register as “Bengali” with the government.
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While temporary shelters have been 
built for an estimated 71,000 IDPs in 
Rakhine State (only slightly more than 
half of the 140,000 IDPs),196 the UNHCR 
estimates that 69,000 IDPs are living 
in “flood-prone areas” or in tents 
or makeshift structures that cannot 
withstand the rainy season.197 Efforts 
are under way to build temporary 
structures capable of resisting the rain 
for the remaining IDPs. The Rakhine 
government, with assistance from the 
central Burmese government, has been 
tasked with the construction of shelters 
for 45,000 people, while the UNHCR 
is constructing shelters for 25,000 
people.198 However, many of these 
structures have to be elevated over rice 
paddies, since the Burmese government 
was reportedly unable to secure more 
suitable land.199 According to Doctors 
Without Borders, the water, sanitation, 
and hygiene (WASH) conditions are 
“far below” international standards in  
a number of camps in Rakhine.200
The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
stated in a press release that, despite 
efforts to improve the situation for IDPs 
in Rakhine State, there are still severe 
gaps in humanitarian assistance that 
need to be addressed. Restrictions 
on IDPs’ freedom of movement have 
prevented them from being able to 
seek employment, health services, and 
education.201 There are also fears that 
the construction of semi-permanent 
shelters will result in the establishment 
of permanent settlements, ensuring 
continued communal segregation.202
“We’re worried for our kids. They  
cannot go to school; living in tents they 
have no privacy. They’ll have no future.” 
– Male IDP, Sittwe camps203
“We can’t get anything here—food, 
medical supplies—for over one month 
from any donors or from INGOs. In  
recent days we are really starving.” 
 – Male IDP, Sittwe camps204
“I have been starving for three days—
three days with no food.”  
– Female IDP, Sittwe camps205
“I am most worried about shelter right 
now. The shelter is not good. Soon the 
rainy season will come, and we do not 
have enough protection from the rain. 
And we do not have enough food. 
How can we live without food? We  
are starving here.”  
– Female IDP, Sittwe camps206
May 25, 2013
The Rakhine State government imposes  
a two-child limit only on Rohingyas in an  
apparent attempt to stem the growth of  
the Muslim population. 
May 28, 2013
Buddhist mobs set fire to a mosque,  
a madrassa, and Muslim shops over two  
days in the city of Lashio in Shan State. 
May 29, 2013
Buddhist mobs destroy a mosque and  
a madrassa in Mone, a small town in the 
Bago Division.
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May 31, 2013
Thirty-five people are arrested and detained 
in connection with the riots in Lashio.
June 5, 2013
Two Muslim women accused of sparking 
the violence in Oakkan in April 2013 are sen-
tenced to two years in prison and hard labor.
Separately, police kill three Rohingya women 
in Mrauk U Township in Rakhine State. The 
women reportedly were part of a crowd 
trying to prevent police from relocating 
Rohingyas from their temporary homes.
June 11, 2013
Burma’s minister of immigration and popu-
lation publicly announces his support for the 
two-child policy for Rohingya families.
Inter-ethnic hatred can be exploited 
by extremists, but all people, not only 
political leaders, have the responsibility 
to turn the national tide against violence 
and toward reconciliation.
T
he trauma among Burmese 
citizens resulting from 60 
years of military dictatorships 
has not gone away with  
the installation of the new  
government. The old regimes 
used divide-and-conquer tactics against 
Rakhines and Rohingyas, which inevi-
tably fueled the animosity in Rakhine 
State that contributed to the situation 
today. The legacy of human rights 
violations in other ethnic states and in 
the central part of the country remain, 
and so far the new government has not 
made any effective attempts at national 
reconciliation or transitional justice. 
Civil society groups and individual citi-
zens have begun this essential work of 
bringing together divided communities. 
The government must follow their lead. 
The new government must show that 
it is not a continuation of the Ne Win 
and Than Shwe regimes, but that it is 
ready to institute true reforms: to stop 
violence and end impunity for human 
rights violations and mass crimes.
PHR documented details of a massacre 
in Meiktila, Mandalay Division, in a May 
2013 report that highlighted one of the 
most extreme examples of anti-Muslim 
violence in recent months. PHR inves-
tigators documented the methodical 
killing and terrorization of Muslim  
children and adults in March 2013 that, 
according to the official tally, took an 
estimated 100 lives. PHR corroborated 
24 of those deaths. During the massacre, 
police officials, including leaders within 
the local police structure, observed  
the violence without intervening or  
protecting those at risk. 
The killings in Meiktila, as well as the 
crimes in Sittwe, Lashio, Okkan, and 
elsewhere, are some of the starkest 
examples of anti-Muslim sentiment 
in Burma. While such massacres are 
not sweeping the country at present, 
the brazen nature of these crimes and 
the widespread culture of impunity 
in which these massacres occur form 
deeply troubling preconditions that 
make such crimes very likely to continue. 
If these conditions go unaddressed, 
Burma may very well face countrywide 
violence on a catastrophic level, including 
potential crimes against humanity and/ 
or genocide. The Burmese government 
must make a concerted effort to  
allow an effective investigation into 
these abuses and hold perpetrators 
accountable.
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The violence in Burma should not be 
considered a sudden and regrettable 
byproduct of the recent reforms or a 
natural occurrence in a nascent democ-
racy. Instead, these violent episodes 
are the result of the complete lack of 
a fair legal system and accountability 
mechanisms under a brutal military 
junta with a long history of targeting 
ethnic groups and exploiting communal 
tensions for its own purposes. Killings, 
forced displacement, and other human 
rights violations are not inevitable but 
rather purposeful attacks on civilians. 
In the past 12 months in Burma, ethnic 
discrimination has exploded into bouts 
of extreme violence that have pre-
dominantly targeted the Rohingya and 
Muslim communities.
Burma is facing a unique opportunity in 
its transition from military dictatorship 
to democracy. The shift is still fragile, 
and the manner in which the Burmese 
government chooses to address vio-
lence against minorities will determine 
whether the transition is successful.
The people of Burma face the difficult 
but necessary task of grappling with 
abuses against minority ethnic and re-
ligious groups and forging social unity. 
Inter-ethnic hatred can be exploited by 
extremists, but all people, not only  
political leaders, have the responsibility 
to turn the national tide against  
violence and toward reconciliation.
Conclusion
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June 12, 2013
UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana 
says, “The human rights violations being 
committed against the Rohingya in Rakhine 
State are widespread and systematic.” 
June 13, 2013
Wirathu, head of the 969 movement, calls 
for a law banning interfaith marriages. 
The Burmese government established 
a Rakhine Investigation Commission 
to investigate violence in Rakhine 
State, uncover its root causes, 
and develop recommendations 
for future action. The commission 
included former political prisoners 
and pro-democracy leaders but no 
members of the Rohingya community. 
The commission’s final report did 
not include a thorough assessment 
of the underlying causes of the  
violence and instead included some 
problematic recommendations that 
may serve to further inflame ethnic 
hatred. Instead of addressing the 
systemic discrimination against the 
Rohingyas, the report plays upon 
that very persecution. It observes, 
for example, that the high birth rate 
among Rohingyas is partly respon-
sible for ethnic tension, repeating 
a theme used by anti-Rohingya ex-
tremists who wish to curb Rohingya 
population growth. The recom-
mendations also focus on security 
measures, including border control, 
which portray the Rohingya commu-
nity as people who do not belong 
in Burma. This characterization of 
Rakhine Commission Report
Rohingyas as outsiders or “Bengalis” 
strengthens the argument of 
extremists who wish to expel 
Rohingyas from the country. In 
general, the commission’s report 
characterizes the violence in Rakhine 
State as a result of a breakdown  
in community relations, where all 
communities were affected equally.  
Members of the Rohingya and 
Rakhine Buddhist communities were 
both perpetrators and victims of the 
violence, but the commission report 
did not detail the ways in which 
Rohingya communities bore the 
brunt of the violence.
While the mere fact that the gov-
ernment established the commis-
sion represents an improvement, 
and some of the commission’s 
recommendations are worthwhile, 
the overall methodology of the 
commission and the tenor of the 
report demonstrate its insufficiency. 
Independent international investi-
gators must conduct a thorough 
and impartial analysis and generate 
recommendations that will end 
the violence and heal traumatized 
communities.
Controversial monk Wirathu attends a 
meeting of Buddhist monks at a monastery 
outside Rangoon on June 27, 2013. 
Photo: Ye Aung Thu/AFP/Getty Images
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I
n documenting the extreme  
persecution of Burma’s Muslim 
population and other ethnic  
minorities, frequently spurred by 
some Buddhist leaders, the aim of 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) 
is to press for leadership and the rule of 
law that will ascribe individual, rather 
than collective, responsibility for these 
crimes. We call on civic leaders of all 
faiths and ethnicities in Burma to work 
together to stop the cycles of violence 
and reprisals and to work toward a tol-
erant and inclusive society that respects 
the human rights of all people. We es-
pecially commend the courage of those 
who have spoken out against prejudice 
and ethnic or religious hatred and who 
have stepped forward to protect the 
most vulnerable in their communities.
PHR calls for the following recommen-
dations to be implemented immediately 
to bring a swift end to the ongoing 
violence in Burma and to promote the 
forms of social dialogue necessary to 
move the country from violence to a 
state of reconciliation. 
To the Government of Burma
The Government of Burma must un-
dertake significant institutional reforms 
to create accountability mechanisms, 
including an independent judiciary that 
would operate under fair and transpar-
ent procedures. For too long, Burma’s 
legal and judicial institutions have oper-
ated to promote government authority, 
not to protect the public. Many draco-
nian laws from the former military re-
gime are still in use; Burma’s parliament 
should conduct a thorough overhaul of 
these oppressive laws and replace them 
with laws that reflect internationally 
recognized norms. Civil society groups, 
including representatives from ethnic 
nationality groups, should be involved 
in this redrafting process. Although 
long-term work is necessary to revamp 
Burma’s institutions of accountability, 
the Government of Burma can take the 
following specific steps without delay:       
• Investigate and prosecute all 
members of the police force 
who commit or facilitate human 
rights violations. Install an internal 
accountability mechanism within 
the police force to fire, demote, 
or otherwise appropriately punish 
officers who do not appropriately 
protect civilians. Vet the police 
and security force structures in a 
transparent manner to remove from 
service any officers clearly shown 
to be complicit in human rights 
violations.
• Redraft the 1982 Citizenship Law 
to comport with internationally 
recognized legal standards. Involve 
Rohingya community members and 
other members of minority groups in 
the redrafting process.
• Immediately allow humanitarian aid 
organizations unimpeded access to 
all those in need, including people 
in internally displaced person (IDP) 
camps.
• Lead an internal campaign to dispel 
hate speech, and publicly and 
officially condemn all acts of violence 
against vulnerable ethnic or religious 
groups.
• Cooperate with any international 
investigation into the 969 movement 
and other organizations that may be 
implicated in anti-Muslim violence.
June 14, 2013
A spokesperson for President Thein Sein says 
that police were justified in shooting three 
Rohingya women.
June 14, 2013
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Navi Pillay expresses concern over human 
rights violations and violence against Burma’s 
Muslims and the lack of accountability.
June 20, 2013
Twelve Nobel Peace Prize laureates release a 
statement to Burma’s government urging it to 
open an international, independent investiga-
tion into the anti-Muslim violence.
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• Move forward with the planned 
establishment of a country office 
of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to provide more consistent 
documentation and protection 
efforts in Burma and to ensure 
compliance with international human 
rights norms.
• Immediately repudiate the two-child 
policy instituted in northern Rakhine 
State and ensure that all state policies 
regarding children and family choice 
reflect internationally recognized 
norms as well as Burma’s legal 
obligations under the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the 
Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.
• Allow local, regional, and 
international journalists and 
human rights investigators to have 
unfettered access to areas where 
violence has occurred.
• Invest in long-term measures to 
promote accountability, such as 
redrafting laws that discriminate 
against particular groups, 
training lawyers and judges, and 
professionalizing the police force. 
Ensure that such institutional reforms 
lead to fair trials for all defendants.
• Pass legislation to ensure that the 
nascent Myanmar National Human 
Rights Commission (MNHRC) 
becomes an independent body 
that operates in accordance 
with the Paris Principles, which 
outline standards for national 
human rights commissions. The 
MNHRC conducted a limited initial 
investigation into the Rakhine 
State violence in June 2012, but its 
work would benefit from formal 
independence from the government.
• Collaborate with international 
humanitarian agencies to facilitate 
family reunification of those 
displaced by the violence and to trace 
missing people.
• Provide security for IDPs to voluntarily 
return to their home communities.
• Dedicate resources to the rebuilding 
of schools, religious sites, homes, 
and other buildings destroyed during 
the violence.
To the Democracy Leaders  
of Burma
Burmese democracy and human rights 
activists have led the campaign against 
oppression and militarism for decades 
and have enjoyed the full support of 
the international community in those 
efforts. As Burma’s political opposition 
has greater freedom and influence 
within the country, democracy leaders 
should call for an end to violence and 
greater protections for minority groups.
• State in unequivocal terms the 
unacceptable nature of violence, no 
matter who the target, and reject 
wholesale the hate speech espoused 
by some members of the 969 
movement.
• Express support for fair, transparent, 
and effective accountability 
mechanisms for crimes, including 
those targeting ethnic and religious 
minorities.
• Specifically counter hate speech 
against Rohingyas, Muslims, and 
other religious and ethnic minorities 
by building a movement for social 
inclusion and reconciliation.
June 25, 2013
Burma’s government bans the sale of that 
week’s issue of Time magazine, featuring an 
image of Wirathu on the cover and naming 
him “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” 
June 27, 2013
Security forces fire on a crowd of Rohingyas 
in an IDP camp in Pauktaw in Rakhine State, 
killing two and injuring six.
June 30, 2013
A mob of 50 people in the town of Thandwe 
in Rakhine State burns down several homes, 
injuring three Kaman Muslims.
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To the United States Government
After years of instituting and enforcing  
strict sanctions against Burma, the 
United States has embarked on a 
new era of engagement with the 
Government of Burma. The United 
States eased sanctions to match incre-
mental reforms, such as increased press 
freedoms and the release of political 
prisoners. U.S. officials are beginning  
to press for military aid to Burma in  
the form of training, claiming that 
such engagement will support reform. 
Burma’s democratic development 
heavily depends on the future role 
of the military and the police forces. 
Therefore, the U.S. government must 
publicly lay out a binding roadmap that 
defines concrete steps the Burmese 
government must take, which then 
allow for specific responses from 
the U.S. government. The Obama 
Administration should report to 
Congress on the implementation of 
each step of the U.S. government’s 
response before further action is taken. 
Accountability and proper vetting (in-
cluding acts of commission and omis-
sion) are indispensable prerequisites for 
any future engagement regarding the 
military and police force. The United 
States should evaluate whether mem-
bers of Burma’s police force or military 
are properly held accountable, no 
matter their rank or position, in order 
to determine whether an acceptable 
degree of accountability has been 
achieved. The United States should:
• Unequivocally and publicly denounce 
all acts of violence against Muslims 
and other ethnic and religious 
minorities. Press the Government 
of Burma to hold all perpetrators 
accountable according to fair and 
transparent procedures.
• Refrain from providing the 
Government of Burma with any 
military assistance, including training, 
until Burmese authorities have vetted 
military, police, and other security 
forces to remove perpetrators of 
human rights violations from the 
institutions and have implemented 
credible accountability mechanisms 
to address violations committed by 
members of the military, police, and 
other security forces.
• Prioritize the protection of human 
rights when designing U.S. foreign 
policy toward Burma, especially as 
U.S. businesses begin to invest in the 
country.
To Members of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council
In June 2013, the Human Rights Council 
adopted by consensus a presidential 
statement on anti-Muslim violence in 
Burma that called for an end to the 
violence and the establishment of 
accountability mechanisms. If Burma 
has not made progress on the recom-
mendations included in that statement, 
the Council should revisit the issue by 
passing a stronger resolution that es-
tablishes an independent investigation 
of anti-Muslim violence in the country. 
The United Nations Human Rights 
Council should:
• Renew the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar when  
the mandate is up for renewal in 
March 2014.
• Follow up the June 2013 presidential 
statement on anti-Muslim violence 
with a stronger resolution that 
establishes an independent 
investigation of anti-Muslim 
violence in Burma and presses the 
Government of Burma for clear 
progress on the recommendations 
listed above.
July 1, 2013
A Buddhist mob destroys nine shops inside a 
Buddhist monastery in Thabeikkyin Township 
in Mandalay Division after hearing rumors 
that Muslims are hiding inside. 
July 1, 2013
A mob of armed Buddhists blockades a major 
road in search of Muslims in Singu Township 
in Mandalay Division, but it is dismantled after 
local authorities intervene. 
July 8, 2013
Six Muslims and 28 Buddhists are convicted 
for crimes they are accused of committing 
during the Meiktila riots, including arson,  
assault, and murder. 
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To Members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations
The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma is 
a member, has traditionally refrained 
from intervening in member-state situ-
ations. The violence in Burma, however, 
is not solely a domestic issue but has 
significant regional ramifications. The 
persecution of Rohingyas, for example, 
is affecting neighboring countries as 
those fearing violence flee Burma. 
ASEAN should therefore:
• Press the Government of Burma 
through bilateral relations, ASEAN 
bodies, and international forums 
to establish fair and transparent 
accountability mechanisms to 
address violence against minority 
groups and reform discriminatory 
laws and practices.
• Use regional and international 
bodies, including the United Nations 
Human Rights Council, to press 
for an independent international 
investigation of anti-Muslim violence 
in Burma.
• Protect all Rohingyas and others 
fleeing Burma and adhere to the 
principle of non-refoulement by 
refusing to return people to Burma 
if they would face violence or 
persecution there.
Historical Timeline of 
Burmese Muslims
 A woman fleeing anti-Muslim violence in Meiktila, located in central Burma,  
takes refuge in an IDP camp outside of town.  
Photo Credit: Heim Aung
Historical Timeline of
Burmese Muslims
1430 – Upon his return from exile in 
Bengal, Buddhist King Narameikhla of 
Arakan reportedly imports aspects of 
the Muslim political economy from the 
Sultanate of Bengal. Muslim soldiers 
from Bengal settle in Arakan. 
1600s – Muslims first settle in what is 
now Mrauk U area in Arakan. 
1650s–1850s – Muslims of south 
Indian and Persian descent serve in the 
Burmese army. 
1784 – Burman forces under King 
Bodawpaya conquer Arakanese 
Kingdom.
1852 – The Second Anglo-Burmese 
War. Britain annexes “Lower Burma,” 
a region that includes the Irrawaddy 
Delta and the entire coast of Burma.
1871–1911 – Bengali Muslims in 
Arakan Kingdom reportedly increase 
from 58,255 in 1871 to 178,647 in 
1911, accounting for 94 percent and  
84 percent of the population in 
the townships of Maungdaw and 
Buthidaung, respectively.
1878 – Burmese King Mindon Min dies, 
and his son, Thibaw Min, assumes the 
throne.
1885 – The Third Anglo-Burmese War 
breaks out in Burma. Britain conquers 
the rest of the country, resulting in the 
total annexation of Burma.
Late 1800s – British colonial admin-
istrators facilitate the immigration of 
Bengalis, Indians, and Arabs for their 
cheap labor.
1937 – Britain makes Burma a separate 
colony from India.
1939–1945 – World War II divides the 
country along ethnic lines; Burmans 
in the central region give support to 
Japanese forces, while ethnic groups in 
mountainous regions support the Allies. 
1940 – The Burmese Independence 
Army (BIA) is organized by the Japanese 
government. The BIA served as Burma’s 
National Army (BNA) during World  
War II. 
1943 – In August, after the Japanese 
declare nominal independence for 
Burma, U Nu, a leader of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party (PRP; it later 
evolved into the Socialist Party), is ap-
pointed foreign minister by Burma’s 
provisional civilian government led by 
Ba Maw. 
1944 – The BIA; the Communist Party 
of Burma (CPB), led by Thakin Soe; and 
the PRP, led by U Nu, join together to 
become the Anti-Fascist Organization 
(AFO), which seeks to resist Japanese 
occupation.
U Nu is appointed minister of informa-
tion of Burma’s provisional government. 
1945 – Japan is defeated, and the AFO 
is renamed the Anti-Fascist People’s 
Freedom League (AFPFL), led by Aung 
San. The AFPFL was the main political 
party in Burma from 1945 to 1962.
1947 –  
January – Britain promises Burmese 
independence within a year; ethnic 
groups are excluded from negotiations.
February – Panglong Conference be-
tween Aung San and the Shan, Kachin, 
and Chin groups expresses solidarity 
and support for a united Burma. Karen 
are present as observers.
July – Aung San is assassinated on July 
19; U Nu assumes leadership of the 
AFPFL. 
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1948 – Burma achieves independence 
from Britain. 
1947–1961 – Mujahid rebels in Arakan 
seek to annex the Mayu frontier 
district to then-East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh). Failing this, the mujahids 
and/or other Muslims call for a Mayu 
frontier state, distinct from a future 
Rakhine State.
The mujahids heighten their call for 
jihad, displacing Arakan Buddhists who 
had been resettled in the once major-
ity-Rohingya areas (now townships) 
of Buthidaung and Maungdaw in the 
Mayu region. The mujahids claim that 
Muslims were prohibited after World 
War II from returning to most areas of 
Arakan, denied government jobs, given 
little socioeconomic support, and treat-
ed as illegal immigrants. 
Moderate Rohingya leaders assert that 
the majority of Arakan Muslims initially 
did not support the rebels.
Large-scale Burmese military opera-
tions are directed against the mujahids, 
culminating in “Operation Monsoon” 
in October 1954. By 1961, the last 
sizable group of mujahid rebels had 
surrendered. 
1958–60 – Burmese General Ne Win 
forms a new government as the AFPL 
party splits.
1960s – The Burmese Army begins 
the “Four Cuts” policy, a counterinsur-
gency strategy aiming to cut off ethnic 
insurgent groups’ access to food, fund-
ing, information, and recruits from the 
local population. This results in forced 
evictions of civilians and other human 
rights violations, including travel  
restrictions, rape, torture, summary  
executions, and the destruction of  
villages, crops, and livestock. 
1960 – U Nu pushes Buddhism as the 
state religion. 
1961 – U Nu establishes a Mayu 
Frontier Administration, including 
Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and western 
Rathedaung, under the administration 
of army officers, and prepares to estab-
lish a separate Rakhine State.
1962 – General Ne Win stages a coup 
and begins “the Burmese Way to 
Socialism,” which results in economic 
collapse. General Ne Win stifles mi-
nority demands for autonomy and/or 
greater rights. 
1963 – Ne Win expels people of Indian 
descent from Burma, including many 
Muslims. Others observe that Ne Win’s 
nationalization of foreign and mi-
nority-owned businesses leads to the 
outward migration of approximately 
300,000 Indians, largely Muslim, and 
100,000 Chinese between 1963 and 
1967. 
1967 – Thousands die from famine 
caused by the government’s high  
demands for rice.
August 13 – Tens of thousands of 
Buddhist Arakanese/Rakhines protest 
in Sittwe against rice quotas demanded 
by the government. Government forc-
es kill over 100 civilians. August 13 is 
now a local holiday in remembrance of 
those killed. 
1970s – Separatist Muslim militancy re-
surges in Buthidaung under the banner 
of the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) 
as access to arms increases during the 
1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. 
1974 – A new constitution transfers 
power from the armed forces to a 
People’s Assembly headed by Ne Win 
and other former military leaders.
1977 – Government begins Nagamin 
(”King Dragon”) operation against 
Rohingyas; persecution results in 
200,000 fleeing to Bangladesh.
Historical Timeline of
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Late 1970s – Armed forces continue 
the “Four Cuts” policy against Buddhist 
Arakanese rebel groups. As a result, 
roughly 2,000 civilians die, 1,500 villages 
are destroyed, and 10,000 people are 
unlawfully detained. 
1980s – Radical RPF members form the 
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). 
By the late 1980s, the RSO is said to be 
receiving training from external jihad 
groups.
1981 – Ne Win relinquishes the presi-
dency to San Yu, a retired general, but 
continues as chairman of the ruling 
Socialist Program Party (BSPP).
1982 – Draconian “citizenship laws” 
are passed that discriminate against 
ethnic minorities, and many Muslims 
lose their citizenship.
1987 – Currency devaluation causes 
anti-government riots.
1988 – A nationwide pro-democra-
cy “8888” movement by students is 
violently put down by government 
troops. In Sittwe alone, 50,000 people 
demonstrate in September. By the end 
of 1988, approximately 10,000 die 
countrywide in the crackdown.
The State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) is formed. 
1989 – SLORC arrests thousands of 
dissidents, changes Burma’s name to 
Myanmar, and places Aung San Suu 
Kyi—National League for Democracy 
(NLD) leader and daughter of Aung 
San—under house arrest. SLORC also 
changes “Arakan” to “Rakhine” and 
the state capital “Akyab” to “Sittwe.”
All Burmese are required to apply for 
new citizenship cards stating ethnicity 
and religion. Rohingyas are not able to 
obtain cards, based on their ethnicity.
1990 – NLD wins a landslide victory  
in the general election, but the  
government ignores the results.
1991 – Aung San Suu Kyi is awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize.
The government initiates “Operation 
Pyi Thaya” (“Clean and Beautiful 
Nation”), dramatically increasing 
the number of military personnel in 
Rakhine State.
1991–1992 – More than 260,000 
Rohingyas flee to Bangladesh from 
human rights abuses committed by the 
Burmese military, including the confis-
cation of land, forced labor, rape, tor-
ture, and summary executions. 
1992 – Than Shwe becomes SLORC 
chairman. 
By April, up to 250,000 Rohingyas are 
displaced from Rakhine State, owing to 
the large-scale counter-insurgency op-
eration directed at the expanding RSO. 
Government of Burma repatriates 
Rohingyas from Bangladesh between 
September and December; some repa-
triation is reportedly forced.
1995 – Doctors Without Borders 
reports that a survey of returned 
Rohingya refugees finds that 63 percent 
did not want to return to Burma and  
65 percent were unaware of the  
principle of non-refoulement.
Aung San Suu Kyi is temporarily re-
leased from house arrest and attends 
first NLD congress since her release.
Burma is admitted to Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); 
SLORC is renamed State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC).
2001 – Clashes between Muslims and 
Buddhists are reported in Rakhine 
State.
2002 – Aung San Suu Kyi is released  
in May after nearly 20 months of house 
arrest. She is taken into “protective cus-
tody” after clashes between her sup-
porters and those of the government.
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2003 – Khin Nyunt becomes prime 
minister, initiates “roadmap to 
democracy.”
Prominent Buddhist monk Wirathu is 
arrested and sentenced to 25 years 
in prison for distributing anti-Muslim 
pamphlets that incited communal riots 
in his birthplace of Kyaukse, a town 
near Meiktila. At least 10 Muslims are 
killed in Kyaukse by a Buddhist mob.
May – Near Deepayin, Sagaing Division, 
70 NLD supporters are killed at a rally 
for Aung San Suu Kyi, allegedly by a 
government-sponsored mob. Suu Kyi 
is placed under house arrest after the 
incident. 
2004 – Khin Nyunt arrested.
2007 – Sharp rise in fuel prices sparks 
nationwide “Saffron Revolution” led by 
Buddhist monks. In Sittwe alone, more 
than 10,000 demonstrate. Government 
forces use tear gas and arrest and beat 
demonstrators, including monks.
2008 – Cyclone Nargis hits Burma, 
killing over 138,000 people. The gov-
ernment prevents aid from reaching 
those in need and moves forward with 
a constitutional referendum directly 
after the cyclone wreaked devastating 
destruction. Activists claim the chaos 
of the typhoon prevented many from 
voting. 
2010 – Country holds general election, 
which is widely criticized by the inter-
national community. SPDC becomes 
Union Solidarity and Development 
Party (USDP) and “wins” control of the 
parliament.
October – Aid workers are reportedly 
prevented from accessing the worst-hit 
areas of Rakhine State in the wake of 
Cyclone Giri.
2011 – Former General Thein Sein is 
sworn in as new president.
June – Fighting erupts between 
Burma’s Army and the Kachin 
Independence Army; civilians are  
displaced and human rights abuses  
by the Burma Army are recorded.
October – General prisoner amnesty 
results in the release of some political 
prisoners.
Laws are passed permitting the  
formation of labor unions and holding 
of peaceful demonstrations.
2012 – Wirathu is released from jail in 
an amnesty for political prisoners. As 
head abbot of the Masoyein Monastery 
in Mandalay, Wirathu spearheads  
the nationalist 969 movement that  
(re)surfaces sometime around April 
2012.
January – Following an earlier attempt 
at consolidation in 1998, Muslim mili-
tant groups, including the RSO and the 
Arakan Rohingya National Organization 
(ARNO), join forces as the Arakan 
Rohingya Union (ARU).
May – Power cuts throughout the coun-
try spark large-scale protests. In Pegu 
Division’s Pyay Township, 100 riot po-
lice stop some 300 protesters. At least 
five are arrested; according to multiple 
accounts, police assault protesters as 
they try to continue their march. 
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